The Joyful Wisdom ("La Gaya Scienza") — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
The Joyful Wisdom ("La Gaya Scienza")
Nietzsche · en
habits, a life which continually required improvisation:—that would be
my banishment and my Siberia.
296.
_A Fixed Reputation._—A fixed reputation was formerly a matter of the
very greatest utility; and wherever society continues to be ruled by the
herd-instinct, it is still most suitable for every individual _to give_
to his character and business _the appearance_ of unalterableness,—even
when they are not so in reality. "One can rely on him, he remains the
same"—that is the praise which has most significance in all dangerous
conditions of society. Society feels with satisfaction that it has a
reliable _tool_ ready at all times in the virtue of this one, in the
ambition of that one, and in the reflection and passion of a third
one,—it honours this _tool-like nature_, this self-constancy, this
unchangeableness in opinions, efforts, and even in faults, with the
highest honours. Such a valuation, which prevails and has prevailed
everywhere simultaneously with the morality of custom, educates
"characters," and brings all changing, re-learning, and
self-transforming into _disrepute_. Be the advantage of this mode of
thinking ever so great otherwise, it is in any case the mode of judging
which is most injurious _to knowledge_: for precisely the good-will of
the knowing one ever to declare himself unhesitatingly as _opposed_ to
his former opinions, and in general to be distrustful of all that wants
to be fixed in him—is here condemned and brought into disrepute. The
disposition of the thinker, as incompatible with a "fixed reputation,"
is regarded as _dishonourable_, while the petrifaction of opinions has
all the honour to itself:—we have at present still to live under the
interdict of such rules! How difficult it is to live when one feels that
the judgment of many millenniums is around one and against one. It is
probable that for many millenniums knowledge was afflicted with a bad
conscience, and that there must have been much self-contempt and secret
misery in the history of the greatest intellects.
297.
_Ability to Contradict._—Everyone knows at present that the ability to
endure contradiction is a high indication of culture. Some people even
know that the higher man courts opposition, and provokes it, so as to
get a cue to his hitherto unknown partiality. But the _ability_ to
contradict, the attainment of _good_ conscience in hostility to the
accustomed, the traditional and the hallowed,—that is more than both the
above-named abilities, and is the really great, new and astonishing
thing in our culture, the step of all steps of the emancipated
intellect: who knows that?—
298.