of morality, and from thence they conclude that these propositions are absolutely binding even upon you and me; or reversely, they come to the conclusion that _no_ morality at all is binding, after the truth has dawned upon them that to different peoples moral valuations are _necessarily_ different: both of which conclusions are equally childish follies. The error of the more subtle amongst them is that they discover and criticise the probably foolish opinions of a people about its own morality, or the opinions of mankind about human morality generally; they treat accordingly of its origin, its religious sanctions, the superstition of free will, and such matters; and they think that just by so doing they have criticised the morality itself. But the worth of a precept, "Thou shalt," is still fundamentally different from and independent of such opinions about it, and must be distinguished from the weeds of error with which it has perhaps been overgrown: just as the worth of a medicine to a sick person is altogether independent of the question whether he has a scientific opinion about medicine, or merely thinks about it as an old wife would do. A morality could even have grown _out of_ an error: but with this knowledge the problem of its worth would not even be touched.—Thus, no one has hitherto tested the _value_ of that most celebrated of all medicines, called morality: for which purpose it is first of all necessary for one—_to call it in question_. Well, that is just our work.— 346.