The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche
Nietzsche · en
Nordau's discussion of Nietzsche's insanity is rather more intelligent
than his discussion of the philosopher's alleged degeneracy, if only
because his facts are less open to dispute, but here, too, he forgets
that the proof of an idea is not to be sought in the soundness of the
man fathering it, but in the soundness of the idea itself. One asks of
a pudding, not if the cook who offers it is a good woman, but if the
pudding itself is good. Nordau, in attempting to dispose of Nietzsche's
philosophy on the ground that the author died a madman, succeeds only
in piling up a mass of uncontroverted but irrelevant accusations. He
shows that Nietzsche was an utter believer in his own wisdom, that he
had a fondness for repeating certain favorite arguments _ad nauseam_,
that he was violently impatient of criticism, that he chronically
underestimated the man opposed to him, that he sometimes indulged in
blasphemy for the sheer joy of shocking folks, and that he was often
hypnotized by the exuberance of his own verbosity, but it must be plain
that this indictment has its effective answer in the fact that it might
be found with equal justice against almost any revolutionary enthusiast
one selected at random--for example, Savonarola, Tolstoi, Luther,
Ibsen, Garrison, Phillips, Wilkes, Bakúnin, Marx, or Nordau himself.
That Nietzsche died insane is undoubted, and that his insanity was not
sudden in its onset is also plain, and one may even admit frankly that
it is visible, here and there, in his writings, particularly those of
his last year or two; but that his principal doctrines, the ideas upon
which his fame are based, are the fantasies of a maniac is certainly
wholly false. Had he sought to prove that cows had wings, it might be
fair today to dismiss him as Nordau attempts to dismiss him. But when
he essayed to prove that Christianity impeded progress, he laid down a
proposition that, whatever its novelty and daring, was obviously not
irrational, and neither was there anything irrational in the reasoning
whereby he supported it. One need go no further for proof of this than
the fact that multitudes of sane men, while he lived and since his
death, have debated that proposition in all seriousness and found a
plentiful food for sober thought in Nietzsche's statement and defense
of it. Ibsen also passed out of life in mental darkness, and so did
Schumann, but no reasonable critic would seek thereby to deny all
intelligibility to "Peer Gynt" or to the piano quintet in E flat.