To appraise the value of a man according to his _utility_ to mankind, or according to what he costs it, or the _damage_ he is able to inflict upon it, is just as good and just as bad as to appraise the value of a work of art according to its _effects._ But in this way the value of one man compared with another is not even touched upon. The "moral valuation," in so far as it is _social_ measures men altogether according to their effects. But what about the man who has his own taste on his tongue, who is surrounded and concealed by his isolation, uncommunicative and not to be communicated with; a man whom no one has fathomed yet--that is to say, a creature of a higher, and, at any rate, _different_ species, how would ye appraise his worth, seeing that ye cannot know him and can compare him with nothing? _Moral valuation_ was the cause of the most enormous obtuseness of judgment: the value of a man in himself is _underrated,_ well-nigh _overlooked,_ practically _denied._ This is the remains of simple-minded teleology: the value of man _can only be measured with regard to other men._ 879. _To be obsessed by moral considerations_ presupposes a very low grade of intellect: it shows that the instinct for special rights, for standing apart, the feeling of freedom in creative natures, in "children of God" (or of the devil), is lacking. And irrespective of whether _he_ preaches a ruling morality or _criticises_ the prevailing ethical code from the point of view of his own ideal: by doing these things a man shows that he belongs to the herd--even though he may be what it is most in need of--that is to say, a "shepherd." 880. We should substitute morality by the will to our own ends, and _consequently_ to the means to them. 881.