The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche · en
Those men who are in themselves destinies, and whose advent is the
advent of fate, the whole race of _heroic_ bearers of burdens: oh!
how heartily and gladly would they have respite from themselves for
once in a while!--how they crave after stout hearts and shoulders, that
they might free themselves, were it but for an hour or two, from that
which oppresses them! And how fruitlessly they crave! ... They wait;
they observe all that passes before their eyes: no man even cometh nigh
to them with a thousandth part of their suffering and passion, no man
guesseth to what end they have waited.... At last, at last, they learn
the first lesson of their life: to wait no longer; and forthwith they
learn their second lesson: to be affable, to be modest; and from that
time onwards to endure everybody and every kind of thing--in short, to
endure still a little more than they had endured theretofore.
6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future.
972.
_The lawgivers of the future._--After having tried for a long time in
vain to attach a particular meaning to the word "philosopher,"--for I
found many antagonistic traits, I recognised that we can distinguish
between two kinds of philosophers:--
(1) Those who desire to establish any large system of values (logical
or moral);
(2) Those who are the _lawgivers_ of such valuations.
The former try to seize upon the world of the present or the past,
by embodying or abbreviating the multifarious phenomena by means of
signs: their object is to make it possible for us to survey, to reflect
upon, to comprehend, and to utilise everything that has happened
hitherto--they serve the purpose of man by using all past things to the
benefit of his future.
The second class, however, are _commanders;_ they say: "Thus shall it
be!" They alone determine the "whither" and the "wherefore," and that
which will be useful and beneficial to man; they have command over the
previous work of scientific men, and all knowledge is to them only
a means to their creations. This second kind of philosopher seldom
appears; and as a matter of fact their situation and their danger is
appalling. How often have they not intentionally blindfolded their
eyes in order to shut out the sight of the small strip of ground which
separates them from the abyss and from utter destruction. Plato, for
instance, when he persuaded himself that "the good," as he wanted it,
was not Plato's good, but "the good in itself," the eternal treasure
which a certain man of the name of Plato had chanced to find on his
way! This same will to blindness prevails in a much coarser form in the
case of the founders of religion; their "Thou shalt" must on no account
sound to their ears like "I will,"--they only dare to pursue their task
as if under the command of God; their legislation of values can only be
a burden they can bear if they regard it as "revelation," in this way
their conscience is not crushed by the responsibility.