The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche · en
We are able to analyse our body, and by doing so we get the same
idea of it as of the stellar system, and the differences between
organic and inorganic lapses. Formerly the movements of the stars were
explained as the effects of beings consciously pursuing a purpose:
this is no longer required, and even in regard to the movements of
the body and its changes, the belief has long since been abandoned
that they can be explained by an appeal to a consciousness which has
a determined purpose. By far the greater number of movements have
nothing to do with consciousness at all: _neither have they anything
to do with sensation._ Sensations and thoughts are extremely _rare_
and _insignificant_ things compared with the innumerable phenomena
occurring every second.
On the other hand, we believe that a certain conformity of means
to ends rules over the very smallest phenomenon, which it is quite
beyond our deepest science to understand; a sort of cautiousness,
selectiveness, co-ordination, and repairing process, etc. In short, we
are in the presence of an _activity_ to which it would be necessary
to ascribe an _incalculably higher and more extensive intellect_ than
the one we are acquainted with. We learn to _think less of_ all that
is conscious: we unlearn the habit of making ourselves responsible for
ourselves, because, as conscious beings fixing purposes, we are but the
smallest part of ourselves.
Of the numerous influences taking effect every second, for instance,
air, electricity, we feel scarcely anything at all. There might be a
number of forces, which, though they never make themselves felt by
us, yet influence us continually. Pleasure and pain are very rare and
scanty phenomena, compared with the countless stimuli with which a cell
or an organ operates upon another cell or organ.
It is the phase of the _modesty of consciousness._ Finally, we can
grasp the conscious ego itself, merely as an instrument in the
service of that higher and more extensive intellect: and then we may
ask whether all conscious _willing,_ all conscious _purposes,_ all
_valuations,_ are not perhaps only means by virtue of which something
essentially _different is attained,_ from that which consciousness
supposes. We _mean_: it is a question of our _pleasure_ and _pain_ but
pleasure and pain might be the means whereby we _had something to do_
which lies outside our consciousness.