Nocturnal Council, which is borrowed from the Areopagus at Athens, as it
existed, or was supposed to have existed, in the days before Ephialtes
and the Eumenides of Aeschylus, when its power was undiminished. In
some particulars Plato appears to have copied exactly the customs and
procedure of the Areopagus: both assemblies sat at night (Telfy). There
was a resemblance also in more important matters. Like the Areopagus,
the Nocturnal Council was partly composed of magistrates and other
state officials, whose term of office had expired. (7) The constitution
included several diverse and even opposing elements, such as
the Assembly and the Nocturnal Council. (8) There was much less
exclusiveness than at Sparta; the citizens were to have an interest in
the government of neighbouring states, and to know what was going on in
the rest of the world.--All these were moderating influences.
A striking similarity between Athens and the constitution of the
Magnesian colony is the use of the lot in the election of judges
and other magistrates. That such a mode of election should have
been resorted to in any civilized state, or that it should have been
transferred by Plato to an ideal or imaginary one, is very singular
to us. The most extreme democracy of modern times has never thought of
leaving government wholly to chance. It was natural that Socrates
should scoff at it, and ask, 'Who would choose a pilot or carpenter or
flute-player by lot' (Xen. Mem.)? Yet there were many considerations
which made this mode of choice attractive both to the oligarch and to
the democrat:--(1) It seemed to recognize that one man was as good as
another, and that all the members of the governing body, whether few or
many, were on a perfect equality in every sense of the word. (2) To the
pious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by man, but by heaven
(compare Laws). (3) It afforded a protection against corruption and
intrigue...It must also be remembered that, although elected by lot,
the persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before they entered
on their office, and were therefore liable, after election, if
disqualified, to be rejected (Laws). They were, moreover, liable to be
called to account after the expiration of their office. In the election
of councillors Plato introduces a further check: they are not to be
chosen directly by lot from all the citizens, but from a select body
previously elected by vote. In Plato's state at least, as we may infer
from his silence on this point, judges and magistrates performed
their duties without pay, which was a guarantee both of their
disinterestedness and of their belonging probably to the higher class of
citizens (compare Arist. Pol.). Hence we are not surprised that the use
of the lot prevailed, not only in the election of the Athenian Council,
but also in many oligarchies, and even in Plato's colony. The
evil consequences of the lot are to a great extent avoided, if the