PROTARCHUS: Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said. SOCRATES: In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family. PROTARCHUS: True. SOCRATES: And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will not be far wrong, if I divine aright. PROTARCHUS: I dare say. SOCRATES: And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the soul--sciences and arts and true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is. PROTARCHUS: Surely. SOCRATES: The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses. PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. SOCRATES: And now, as Orpheus says, 'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.' Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set the crown on our discourse. PROTARCHUS: True. SOCRATES: Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus. PROTARCHUS: How? SOCRATES: Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the good. PROTARCHUS: I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant a recapitulation. SOCRATES: Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure. PROTARCHUS: True. SOCRATES: But, suspecting that there were other things which were also better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place as well as the first. PROTARCHUS: You did. SOCRATES: Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the unsatisfactory nature of both of them. PROTARCHUS: Very true. SOCRATES: The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection. PROTARCHUS: Most true. SOCRATES: But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure. PROTARCHUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And, according to the judgment which has now been given, pleasure will rank fifth. PROTARCHUS: True.