[Side-note: Each thing must exist in its own place--Grain of millet not sonorous.] Again--If existing things be many and discontinuous, each of these must exist in a place of its own. Nothing can exist except in some place. But the place is itself an existing something: each place must therefore have a place of its own to exist in: the second place must have a third place to exist in and so forth ad infinitum.[20] We have here a farther _reductio ad impossibile_ of the original hypothesis: for that hypothesis denies the continuity of space, and represents space as a multitude of discontinuous portions or places. [Footnote 20: Aristotel. Physic. iv. 1, p. 209, a. 22; iv. 3, p. 210, b. 23. Aristotle here observes that the Zenonian argument respecting place is easy to be refuted; and he proceeds to give the refutation. But his refutation is altogether unsatisfactory. Those who despise these Zenonian arguments as _sophisms_, ought to look at the way in which they were answered, at or near the time. Eudêmus ap. Simplik. ad Aristot. Physic. f. 131. [Greek: a)/xion ga\r pa=n tô=n o)/ntôn pou= ei)=nai; ei) de\ o( to/pos tô=n o)/ntôn, pou= a)\n ei)/ê?]] Another argument of Zeno is to the following effect:--"Does a grain of millet, when dropped upon the floor, make sound? No.--Does a bushel of millet make sound under the same circumstances? Yes.--Is there not a determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain? There is.--There must therefore be the same proportion between the sonorousness of the two. If one grain be not sonorous, neither can ten thousand grains be so."[21] [Footnote 21: Aristotel. Physic. vii. 5, p. 250, a. 20, with the Scholia of Simplikius on the passage, p. 423, ed. Brandis.] To appreciate the contradiction brought out by Zeno, we must recollect that he is not here reasoning about facts of sense, phenomenal and relative--but about things in themselves, absolute and ultra-phenomenal** realities. He did not deny the fact of sense: to appeal to that fact in reply, would have been to concede his point. The adversaries against whom he reasoned (Protagoras is mentioned, but he can hardly have been among them, if we have regard to his memorable dogma, of which more will be said presently) were those who maintained the plurality of absolute substances, each for itself, with absolute attributes, apart from the fact of sense, and independent of any sentient subject. One grain of millet (Zeno argues) has no absolute sonorousness, neither can ten thousand such grains taken together have any. Upon the hypothesis of absolute reality as a discontinuous multitude, you are here driven to a contradiction which Zeno intends as an argument against the hypothesis. There is no absolute sonorousness in the ten thousand grains: the sound which they make is a phenomenal fact, relative to us as sentients of sound, and having no reality except in correlation with a hearer.[22]