Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 1 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 1
Plato · en
If, indeed, we judge the question, not from their standing-point, but
from our own, we shall solve the difficulty by adopting the
last-mentioned answer. We shall admit that One and Many are predicates
which do not necessarily exclude each other; but we shall refrain from
affirming or denying either of them respecting the Real, the Absolute,
the Unconditioned. Of an object absolutely one and continuous--or of
objects absolutely many and discontinuous, apart from the facts of our
own sense and consciousness, and independent of any sentient subject--we
neither know nor can affirm anything. Both these predicates (One--Many)
are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and
comparisons of our own senses and consciousness, and serving only to
describe, to record, and to classify, those facts. Discrete quantity
or number, or succession of distinct unities--continuous quantity, or
motion and extension--are two conceptions derived from comparison,
abstracted and generalised from separate particular phenomena of our
consciousness; the continuous, from our movements and the
consciousness of persistent energy involved therein--the
discontinuous, from our movements, intermitted and renewed, as well as
from our impressions of sense. We compare one discrete quantity with
another, or one continual quantity with another, and we thus ascertain
many important truths: but we select our unit, or our standard of
motion and extension, as we please, or according to convenience,
subject only to the necessity of adapting our ulterior calculations
consistently to this unit, when once selected. The same object may
thus be considered sometimes as one, sometimes as many; both being
relative, and depending upon our point of view. Motion, Space, Time,
may be considered either as continuous or as discontinuous: we may
reason upon them either as one or the other, but we must not confound
the two points of view with each other. When, however, we are called
upon to travel out of the Relative, and to decide between Parmenides
and his opponents--whether the Absolute be One or Multitudinous--we
have only to abstain from affirming either, or (in other words) to
confess our ignorance. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous,
self-existent One, or of an absolute, discontinuous Many.
[Side-note: Zeno did not deny motion as a fact, phenomenal and
relative.]