[Side-note: His arguments cited and criticised.] Aristotle urges against the Megarics various arguments, as follows:--1. Their doctrine implies that the architect is not an architect, and does not possess his professional skill,[55] except at the moment when he is actually building.--But the Megarics would have denied that their doctrine did imply this. The architect possesses his art at all times: but his art does not constitute a power of building except under certain accompanying conditions. [Footnote 55: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 3, 1047, a. 3. [Greek: o(/tan pau/sêtai (oi)kodomô=n) ou)ch e(/xei tê\n te/chnên.]] 2. The Megaric doctrine is the same as that of Protagoras, implying that there exists no perceivable Object, and no Subject capable of perceiving, except at the moment when perception actually takes place.[56] On this we may observe, that the Megarics coincide with Protagoras thus far, that they bring into open daylight the relative and conditional, which the received phraseology tends to hide. But neither they nor he affirm what is here put upon them. When we speak of a perceivable Object, we mean that which may and will be perceived, _if_ there be a proper Subject to perceive it: when we affirm a Subject capable of perception, we mean, one which will perceive, under those circumstances which we call the presence of an Object suitably placed. The Subject and Object are correlates: but it is convenient to have a language in which one of them alone is introduced unconditionally, while the conditional sign is applied to the correlate: though the matter affirmed involves a condition common to both. [Footnote 56: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 3, 1047, a. 8-13.] 3. According to the Megaric doctrine (Aristotle argues) every man when not actually seeing, is blind; every man when not actually speaking, is dumb.--Here the Megarics would have said that this is a misinterpretation of the terms dumb and blind; which denote a person who cannot speak or see, even though he wishes it. One who is now silent, though not dumb, may speak if he wills it: but his own volition is an essential condition.[57] [Footnote 57: The question between Aristotle and the Megarics has not passed out of debate with modern philosophers.