[Footnote 59: Aristotle does in fact grant all that is here said, in the same book and in the page next subsequent to that which contains his arguments against the Megaric doctrine, Metaphys. [Greek: Th]. 5, 1048, a. 1-24. In this chapter Aristotle distinguishes powers belonging to things, from powers belonging to persons--powers irrational from powers rational--powers in which the agent acts without any will or choice, from those in which the will or choice of the agent is one item of the aggregate of conditions. He here expressly recognises that the power of the agent, separately considered, is only _conditional_; that is, conditional on the presence and suitable state of the patient, as well as upon the absence of counteracting circumstances. But he contends that such absence of counteracting circumstances is plainly implied, and need not be expressly mentioned in the definition. [Greek: e)pei\ de\ to\ dunato\n ti\ dunato\n kai\ pote\ kai\ pô=s kai\ o(/sa a)/lla a)na/gkê prosei=nai e)n tô=| diorismô=|-- to\ dunato\n kata\ lo/gon a(/pan a)na/gkê, o(/tan o)re/gêtai, ou)= t' e)/chei tê\n du/namin kai\ ô(s e)/chei, tou=to poiei=n; e)/chei de\ paro/ntos tou= pathêtikou= kai\ ô(di\ e)/chontos poiei=n; _ei) de\ mê/, poiei=n ou) dunê/setai_. to\ ga\r mêtheno\s tô=n e(/xô kôlu/ontos prosdiori/zesthai, ou)the\n e)/ti dei=; tê\n ga\r du/namin e)/chei ô(/s e)/sti du/namis tou= poiei=n, _e)/sti d' ou) pa/ntôs_, a)ll' e)cho/ntôn pô=s, e)n oi(=s a)phoristhê/setai kai\ ta\ e(/xô kôlu/onta; a)phairei=tai ga\r tau=ta tô=n e)n tô=| diorismô=| proso/ntôn e)/nia]. The commentary of Alexander Aphr. upon this chapter is well worth consulting (pp. 546-548 of the edition of his commentary by Bonitz, 1847). Moreover Aristotle affirms in this chapter, that when [Greek: to\ poiêtiko\n] and [Greek: to\ pathêtiko\n] come together under suitable circumstances, the power will certainly pass into act. Here then, it seems to me, Aristotle concedes the doctrine which the Megarics affirmed; or, if there be any difference between them, it is rather verbal than real. In fact, Aristotle's reasoning in the third chapter (wherein he impugns the doctrine of the Megarics), and the definition of [Greek: dunato\n] which he gives in that chapter (1047, a. 25), are hardly to be reconciled with his reasoning in the fifth chapter. Bonitz (Notes on the Metaphys. pp. 393-395) complains of the _mira levitas_ of Aristotle in his reasoning against the Megarics, and of his omitting to distinguish between _Vermögen_ and _Möglichkeit_. I will not use so uncourteous a phrase; but I think his refutation of the Megarics is both unsatisfactory and contradicted by himself. I agree with the following remark of Bonitz:--"Nec mirum, quod Megarici, aliis illi quidem in rebus arguti, in hâc autem satis acuti, existentiam [Greek: tô=| duna/mei o)/nti] tribuere recusarint," &c.] [Side-note: Diodôrus Kronus--his doctrine about [Greek: to\ dunato/n].]