There is another singular doctrine, which Aristotle ascribes to Antisthenes, and which Plato notices and confutes; alluding to its author contemptuously, but not mentioning his name. Every name (Antisthenes argued) has its own special reason or meaning ([Greek: oi)kei=os[126] lo/gos]), declaring the essence of the thing named, and differing from every other word: you cannot therefore truly predicate any one word of any other, because the reason or meaning of the two is different: there can be no true propositions except identical propositions, in which the predicate is the same with the subject--"man is man, good is good". "Man is good" was an inadmissible proposition: affirming different things to be the same, or one thing to be many.[127] Accordingly, it was impossible for two speakers really to contradict each other. There can be no contradiction between them if both declare the essence of the same thing--nor if neither of them declare the essence of it--nor if one speaker declares the essence of one thing, and another speaker that of another. But one of these three cases must happen: therefore there can be no contradiction.[128] [Footnote 126: Diogen. L. vi. 3. [Greek: Prôto/s te ô(ri/sato] (Antisthenes) [Greek: lo/gon, ei)pô/n, lo/gos e)sti\n o( to\ ti/ ê)=n ê)/ e)sti dêlô=n.]] [Footnote 127: Aristotle, Metaphy. [Greek: D]. 1024, b. 32, attributes this doctrine to Antisthenes by name; which tends to prove that Plato meant Antisthenes, though not naming him, in Sophist, p. 251 B, where he notices the same doctrine. Compare Philêbus, p. 14 D. It is to be observed that a doctrine exactly the same as that which Plato here censures in Antisthenes, will be found maintained by the Platonic Sokrates himself, in Plato, Hippias Major, p. 304 A. See chap, xiii. vol. ii. of the present work.] [Footnote 128: Aristot. Topic. i. p. 104, b. 20. [Greek: the/sis de/ e)stin u(po/lêpsis para/doxos tô=n gnôri/môn tino\s kata\ philosophi/an; oi(=on o(/ti ou)k e)/stin a)ntile/gein, katha/per e)/phê A)ntisthe/nês]. Plato puts this [Greek: the/sis] into the mouth of Dionysodorus, in the Euthydêmus--p. 286 B; but he says (or makes Sokrates say) that it was maintained by many persons, and that it had been maintained by Protagoras, and even by others yet more ancient. Antisthenes had discussed it specially in a treatise of three sections polemical against Plato--[Greek: Sa/thôn, ê)\ peri\ tou= a)ntile/gein, a, b, g] (Diog. L. vi. 16).] [Side-note: The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of Aristotle.]