Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Römisch. Phil. vol. ii. xciii. 1) gives something like this as the probable purpose of Antisthenes--"Nur Eins bezeichne die Wesenheit eines Dinges--die Wesenheit als einfachen Träger des mannichfaltigen der Eigenschaften"(this is rather too Aristotelian)--"zur Abwehr von Streitigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der Erscheinungen". Compare also Ritter, Gesch. Phil. vol. ii. p. 130. We read in the Kratylus, that there were persons who maintained the rectitude of all names: to say that a name was not right, was (in their view) tantamount to saying that it was no name at all, but only an unmeaning sound (Plato, Krat. pp. 429-430).] [Footnote 130: Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1119 C-D.] [Side-note: Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication.] Stilpon, however, while rejecting (as Antisthenes had done) the universal Ideas[131] or Forms, took a larger ground of objection. He pronounced them to be inadmissible both as subject and as predicate. If you speak of Man in general (he said), what, or whom, do you mean? You do not mean A or B, or C or D, &c.: that is, you do not mean any one of these more than any other. You have no determinate meaning at all: and beyond this indefinite multitude of individuals, there is nothing that the term can mean. Again, as to predicates--when you say, _The man runs_, or _The man is good_, what do you mean by the predicate _runs_, or is _good_? You do not mean any thing specially belonging to man: for you apply the same predicates to many other subjects: you say _runs_, about a horse, a dog, or a cat--you say _good_ in reference to food, medicine, and other things besides. Your predicate, therefore, being applied to many and diverse subjects, belongs not to one of them more than to another: in other words, it belongs to neither: the predication is not admissible.[132] [Footnote 131: Hegel (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. i. p. 123) and Marbach (Geschichte der Philos. s. 91) disallow the assertion of Diogenes, that Stilpon [Greek: a)nê/rei ta\ ei)/dê]. They maintain that Stilpon rejected the particular affirmations, and allowed only general or universal affirmations. This construction appears to me erroneous.] [Footnote 132: Diog. L. ii. 113; Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, 1119-1120. [Greek: ei) peri\ i(/ppou to\ tre/chein katêgorou=men, ou)/ phêsi] (Stilpon) [Greek: tau)to\n ei)=nai tô=| peri\ ou)= katêgorei=tai to\ katêgorou/menon--e)kate/rou ga\r a)paitou/menoi to\n lo/gon, ou) to\n au)to\n a)podi/domen u(pe\r a)mphoi=n. O(/then a(marta/nein tou\s e(/teron e(te/rou katêgorou=ntas. Ei) me\n ga\r tau)ton e)sti tô=| a)nthrô/pô| to\ a)gatho/n, kai\ tô=| i(/ppô| to\ tre/chein, pô=s kai\ siti/ou kai\ pharma/kou to\ a)gatho/n? kai\ nê\ Di/a pa/lin le/ontos kai\ kuno\s to\ tre/chein, katêgorou=men? ei) d' e(/teron, ou)k o)rthô=s _a)/nthrôpon a)gatho\n kai\ i(/ppon tre/chein_ le/gomen].