reverse was the truth: but under the difficult conditions of life, a man must be satisfied if he realised some particular pleasurable conjunctions, without aspiring to a continuance or totality of the like.[210] [Footnote 206: Diog. L. ii. 86-87. [Greek: du/o pa/thê u(phi/stanto, po/non kai\ ê(donê/n; tê\n me\n lei/an ki/nêsin, tê\n ê(donê/n, to\n de\ po/non, trachei=an ki/nêsin; mê\ diaphe/rein te ê(donê\n ê(donê=s, mêde\ ê(/dion ti ei)=nai; kai\ tê\n me\n, eu)dokêtê\n** pa=si zô/ois, to\n de\ a)pokroustiko/n.]] [Footnote 207: Diog. L. ii. p. 87. [Greek: mê\ diaphe/rein te ê(donê\n ê(donê=s, mêde\ ê(/dion ti ei)=nai]. They did not mean by these words to deny that one pleasure was more vehement and attractive than another pleasure, or that one pain is more vehement and deterrent than another pain: for it is expressly said afterwards (s. 90) that they admitted this. They meant to affirm that one pleasure did not differ from another _so far forth as pleasure_: that all pleasures must be ranked as a class, and compared with each other in respect of intensity, durability, and other properties possessed in greater or less degree.] [Footnote 208: Diog. L. ii. pp. 88-89. Athenæus, xii. p. 544.] [Footnote 209: Diog. L. ii. 89-90. [Greek: mê\ ou)/sês tê=s a)poni/as ê)\ tê=s a)êdoni/as kinê/seôs, e)pei\ ê( a)poni/a oi(onei\ katheu/donto/s e)sti kata/stasis--me/sas katasta/seis ô)no/mazon a)êdoni/an kai\ a)poni/an]. A doctrine very different from this is ascribed to Aristippus in Galen--Placit. Philos. (xix. p. 230, Kühn). It is there affirmed that by pleasure Aristippus understood, not the pleasure of sense, but that disposition of mind whereby a person becomes insensible to pain, and hard to be imposed upon ([Greek: a)na/lgêtos kai\ dusgoê/teutos]).] [Footnote 210: Diog. L. ii. 91. It does not appear that the Kyrenaic sect followed out into detail the derivative pleasures and pains; nor the way in which, by force of association, these come to take precedence of the primary, exercising influence on the mind both more forcible and more constant. We find this important fact remarkably stated in the doctrine of Kalliphon. Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. p. 415, ed. 1629. [Greek: Kata\ de\ tou\s peri\ Kalliphô=nta, e(/neka me\n tê=s ê(donê=s pareisê=lthen ê( a)retê/; chro/nô| de\ u(/steron, to\ peri\ au)tê\n ka/llos katidou=sa, i)so/timon e(autê\n tê=| a)rchê=|, toute/sti tê=| ê(donê=|, pare/schen.]] [Side-note: Prudence--good, by reason of the pleasure which it ensured, and of the pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and honourable, by law or custom--not by nature.]