The Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by Sokrates to explain [Greek: to\ philokerde\s], defines it in this last sense, as conveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different explanations of it (always in this sense), each of which Sokrates shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and the question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato's writings), what is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge? The cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to know,--then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a [Greek: philokerdê/s]: if the agent be supposed not to know--then, on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The Companion is persuaded that there is such a thing as "love of gain" in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable definition, to discriminate it from "love of gain" in the ordinary or innocent sense. [Side-note: Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word _gain_? None is found.] The same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has given the liberty of retractation. The Collocutor maintains that there is bad _gain_, as well as good _gain_. But what is that common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word _gain_, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of _gain_, that which a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as well as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order to acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are lovers of gain. [Side-note: Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up.]