As to the assertion--that Law is one thing here, another thing there, one thing at one time, another thing at another--Sokrates contests it. Just things are just (he says) everywhere and at all times; unjust things are unjust also. Heavy things are heavy, light things light, at one time, as well as at another. So also honourable things are everywhere honourable, base things everywhere base. In general phrase, existent things are everywhere existent,[37] non-existent things are not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the existent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only the man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains the existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those laid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree in what they lay down: the laws of cookery, the laws of agriculture and of gardening--are rescripts delivered by artists who know respectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust, about the political and social arrangements of the city--the authoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists or men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying down the same: that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers. It is only the right, the true, the real--that which these artists attain--which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called. That which is not right is not a law,--ought not to be so called--and is only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.[38] [Footnote 37: M. Boeckh remarks justly in his note on this passage--"neque enim illud demonstratum est, eadem omnibus legitima esse--sed tantum, _notionem_" (rather the sentiment or emotion) "_legitimi_ omnibus eandem esse. Sed omnia scriptor hic confundit."] [Footnote 38: Plato, Minos, 317 C.] [Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato--he acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to _be_ Law.]