Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
In the Minos, this general Platonic view is applied to Law: in the
Politikus, to government and social administration: in the Kratylus,
to naming or language. In the Politikus, we find the received
classification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy)
discarded as improper; and the assertion advanced, That there is only
one government right, true, genuine, really existing--government by
the uncontrolled authority and superintendence of the man of exalted
intelligence: he who is master in the art of governing, whether
such man do in fact hold power anywhere or not. All other governments
are degenerate substitutes for this type, some receding from it less,
some more.[42] Again, in the Kratylus, where names and name-giving
are discussed, Sokrates[43] maintains that things can only be named
according to their true and real nature--that there is, belonging to
each thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only
by the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver: who alone is competent
to bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name,
possessing rectitude by nature ([Greek: o)rtho/tês phu/sei]).[44]
This Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages
in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers,
although the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the Form
are very different.[45] If names be not thus apportioned by the
systematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by
insensible and unsystematic growth--they will be unworthy substitutes
for the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies
possess; according to the opinion announced by Kratylus in that same
dialogue, they will not be names at all.[46]
[Footnote 42: Plato, Politikus, 293 C-E. [Greek: tau/tên o)rthê\n
diaphero/ntôs ei)=nai kai\ mo/nên politei/an, e)n ê(=| tis a)\n
eu(/riskoi tou\s a)/rchontas a)lêthô=s e)pistê/monas kai\ ou)
dokou=ntas mo/non . . . to/te kai\ kata\ tou\s toiou/tous o(/rous
ê(mi=n mo/nên o)rthê\n politei/an ei)=nai r(ête/on. o(/sas de\
a)/llas le/gomen, _ou) gnêsi/as ou)d' o)/ntôs ou)/sas lekte/on_,
a)lla\ memimême/nas tau/tên, a(/s me\n eu)no/mous le/gomen, e)pi\ ta\
kalli/ô, ta\s de\ a)/llas e)pi\ ta\ ai)schi/ona memimê=sthai.]
The historical (Xenophontic) Sokrates asserts this same position in
Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 9, 10). "Sokrates said that Kings and
Rulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the
sceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or had acquired power by
force or fraud," &c.
The Kings of Sparta and Macedonia, the [Greek: Boulê\] and [Greek:
Dê=mos] of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse or Pheræ are here declared
to be not real rulers at all.]
[Footnote 43: Plato, Kratylus, 387 D.]
[Footnote 44: Plato, Kratyl. 388 A-E.]