Whoever has followed the abstract of the Minos, which I have just given, will remark the different explanations of the word Law--both those which are disallowed, and that which is preferred, though left incomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many writers, modern as well an ancient, two distinct modes of confusion traceable--pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr. Bentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Between Law as it is, and Law as it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent rulers, and enforced by penal sanction--and Laws signifying uniformities of fact expressed in general terms, such as the Law of Gravitation, Crystallisation, &c.--We can hardly say that in the dialogue Minos, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of confusion: for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of Law, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws everywhere being disallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does fall into the second, when he identifies the Lawful with the Real or Existent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact. There is also much confusion, if we compare the Minos with other dialogues; wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as the laws and customs actually existing or imperative in any given state--Athens, Sparta, or elsewhere ([Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena], according to the first words in the Minos). For example, in the harangue which he supposes to be addressed to Sokrates in the Kriton, and which he invests with so impressive a character--the Laws of Athens are introduced as speakers: but according to the principles laid down in the Minos, three-fourths of the Laws of Athens could not be regarded as laws at all. If therefore we take Plato's writings throughout, we shall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word Law, or that he escapes the frequent confusion between Law as it actually exists and Law as it ought to be.[49]