"Ego odi homines ignavâ operâ et philosophiâ sententiâ," is a line cited by Cicero out of one of the Latin comic writers.] * * * * * [Side-note: Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education.] This portion of the dialogue, which forms a sort of preamble to the main discussion, brings out forcibly some of the Platonic points of view. We have seen it laid down in the Kriton--That in questions about right and wrong, good and evil, &c., we ought not to trust the decision of the Many, but only that of the One Wise Man. Here we learn something about the criteria by which this One man may be known. He must be one who has gone through a regular training under some master approved in ethical or educational teaching: or, if he cannot produce such a certificate, he must at least cite sufficient examples of men whom he has taught well himself. This is the Sokratic comparison, assimilating the general art of living well to the requirements of a special profession, which a man must learn through express teaching, from a master who has proved his ability, and through conscious application of his own. Nikias and Lachês give their opinions offhand and confidently, upon the question whether lessons from the master of arms be profitable to youth or not. Plato, on the contrary, speaking through Sokrates, points out that this is only one branch of the more comprehensive question as to education generally--"What are the qualities and habits proper to be imparted to youth by training? What is the proper treatment of the mind? No one is competent to decide the special question, except he who has professionally studied the treatment of the mind." To deal with the special question, without such preliminary general preparation, involves rash and unverified assumptions, which render any opinion so given dangerous to act upon. Such is the judgment of the Platonic Sokrates, insisting on the necessity of taking up ethical questions in their most comprehensive aspect. [Side-note: Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this man is never seen or identified.] Consequent upon this preamble, we should expect that Lachês and Nikias would be made to cite the names of those who had been their masters; or to produce some examples of persons effectively taught by themselves. This would bring us a step nearer to that One Wise Man--often darkly indicated, but nowhere named or brought into daylight--from whom alone we can receive a trustworthy judgment. But here, as in the Kriton and so many other Platonic dialogues, we get only a Pisgah view of our promised adviser--nothing more. The discussion takes a different turn. * * * * * [Side-note: We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education. Virtue, as a whole, is too large a question. We will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage.]