Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
This cognition of good and evil--the science of the profitable--is
here (in the Charmidês) proclaimed by Sokrates to have a place of its
own among the other sciences; and even to be first among them,
essentially necessary to supervise and direct them, as it had been
declared in Alkibiadês II. Now the same supervising place and
directorship had been claimed by Kritias for Temperance as he
defines it--that is, self-knowledge, or the cognition of our
cognitions and non-cognitions. But Sokrates doubts even the reality
of such self-knowledge: and granting for argument's sake that it
exists, he still does not see how it can be profitable. For the
utmost which its supervision can ensure would be, that each
description of work shall be scientifically done, by the skilful man,
and not by the unskilful. But it is not true, absolutely speaking (he
argues), that acting scientifically or with knowledge is sufficient
for well doing or for happiness: for the question must next be
asked--Knowledge--of what? Not knowledge of leather-cutting, carpenter's
or brazier's work, arithmetic, or even medicine: these, and many others,
a man may possess, and may act according to them; but still he will
not attain the end of being happy. All cognitions contribute in
greater or less proportion towards that end: but what contributes
most, and most essentially, is the cognition of good and evil,
without which all the rest are insufficient. Of this last-mentioned
cognition or science, it is the special object to ensure profit or
benefit:[42] to take care that everything done by the other sciences
shall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end
Happiness. After this, there is no province left for
temperance--_i.e._, self-knowledge, or the knowledge of cognitions and
non-cognitions: no assignable way in which it can yield any benefit.[43]
[Footnote 42: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: Ou)ch au(/tê| de/ ge, ô(s
e)/oiken, e)sti\n ê( sôphrosu/nê, a)ll' ê(=s e)/rgon e)sti\ to\
ô)phelei=n ê(ma=s. Ou) ga\r e)pistêmô=n ge kai\ a)nepistêmosunô=n
ê( e)pistê/mê e)sti/n, a)lla\ a)gathou= te kai\ kakou=.]]
[Footnote 43: Plato, Charm. 174 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai
dêmiourgo/s? Ou) dê=ta. A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/chnês u(gi/eia? ê)\ ou)/?
A)/llês; Ou)d' a)/ra ô)phelei/as, ô)= e(tai=re; a)/llê| ga\r au)=
a)pe/domen tou=to to\ e)/rgon te/chnê| nu=n dê/; ê)= ga\r? Pa/nu ge.
Pô=s ou)=n ô)phe/limos e)/stai ê(sôphrosu/nê, ou)demia=s ô)phelei/as
ou)=sa dêmiourgo/s? Ou)damô=s, ô)= Sô/krates, e)/oike/ ge.]]
[Side-note: Knowledge, always relative to some object known.
Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology.]