Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
[Footnote 39: Plato, Lysis, 218 C. [Greek: lei/pontai dê\ oi(
e)/chontes me\n to\ kako\ tou=to, tê\n a)/gnoian, mê/pô de\ u(p'
au)tou= o)/ntes a)gnô/mones mêd' a)mathei=s, a)ll' e)/ti ê(gou/menoi
mê\ ei)de/nai a)\ mê\ i)/sasi; dio\ dê\ philosophou=sin oi( ou)/te
a)gathoi\ ou)/te kakoi/ pô o)/ntes; o(/soi de\ kakoi/, ou)
philosophou=sin, ou)de\ oi( a)gathoi/.] Compare the phrase of Seneca,
Epist. 59, p. 211, Gronov.: "Elui difficile est: non enim inquinati
sumus, sed infecti".]
[Side-note: This general theory illustrated by the case
of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of
ignorance the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and
Plato upon this attribute.]
This meaning of philosophy, though it is not always and consistently
maintained throughout the Platonic writings, is important as
expanding and bringing into system the position laid down by Sokrates
in the Apology. He there disclaimed all pretensions to wisdom, but he
announced himself as a philosopher, in the above literal sense: that
is, as ignorant, yet as painfully conscious of his own ignorance, and
anxiously searching for wisdom as a corrective to it: while most men
were equally ignorant, but were unconscious of their own ignorance,
believed themselves to be already wise, and delivered confident
opinions without ever having analysed the matters on which they
spoke. The conversation of Sokrates (as I have before remarked) was
intended, not to teach wisdom, but to raise men out of this false
persuasion of wisdom, which he believed to be the natural state of
the human mind, into that mental condition which he called
philosophy. His Elenchus made them conscious of their ignorance,
anxious to escape from it, and prepared for mental efforts in search
of knowledge: in which search Sokrates assisted them, but without
declaring, and even professing inability to declare, where that truth
lay in which the search was to end. He considered that this change
was in itself a great and serious improvement, converting what was
evil, radical, and engrained--into evil superficial and removable;
which was a preliminary condition to any positive acquirement. The
first thing to be done was to create searchers after truth, men who
would look at the subject for themselves with earnest attention, and
make up their own individual convictions. Even if nothing ulterior
were achieved, that alone would be a great deal. Such was the scope
of the Sokratic conversation; and such the conception of philosophy
(the capital peculiarity which Plato borrowed from Sokrates), which
is briefly noted in this passage of the Lysis, and developed in other
Platonic dialogues, especially in the Symposion,[40] which we shall
reach presently.
[Footnote 40: Plato, Sympos. 202-203-204. Phædrus, 278 D.]
[Side-note: Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or
original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved
through association with this. The object is, Good.]