Thus, for example, if we take the first sophism introduced by the two exhibitors, upon which they bring the youth Kleinias, by suitable questions, to declare successively both sides of the alternative--"Which of the two is it that learns, the wise or the ignorant?"--Sokrates himself elucidates it by pointing out that the terms used are equivocal:[46] You might answer it by using the language ascribed to Dionysodorus in another part of this dialogue--"Neither and Both".[47] The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D--"Are there persons who speak of things as they are? Good men speak of things as they are: they speak of good men well, of bad men badly: therefore, of course, they speak of stout men stoutly, and of hot men hotly. Ay! rejoins the respondent Ktesippus, angrily--they speak of cold men coldly, and say that they talk coldly."[48] These are fallacies of double meaning of words--or double construction of phrases: as we read also in page 287 D, where the same Greek verb ([Greek: noei=n]) may be construed either to _think_ or to _mean_: so that when Sokrates talks about what a predication _means_--the Sophists ask him--"Does anything _think_, except things having a soul? Did you ever know any predication that had a soul?" [Footnote 46: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 275 D--278 D. Aristotle also adverts to this fallacy, but without naming the Euthydêmus. See Soph. El. 4, 165, b. 30.] [Footnote 47: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 300 D. [Greek: Ou)de/tera kai\ a)mpho/tera]] [Footnote 48: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 284 E. [Greek: tou\s gou=n psuchrou\s psuchrô=s le/gousi/ te kai\ phasi\ diale/gesthai.] The metaphorical sense of [Greek: psuchro\s] is _pointless_, _stupid_, _out of taste_, _out of place_, _&c._] [Side-note: Fallacies--_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_--in the Euthydêmus.] Again, the two Sophists undertake to prove that Sokrates, as well as the youth Kleinias and indeed every one else, knows everything. "Can any existing thing _be_ that which it is, and at the same time _not be_ that which it is?--No.--You know some things?--Yes.--Then if you know, _you are knowing_?--Certainly. I am knowing of those particular things.--That makes no difference: if you are knowing, you necessarily know everything.--Oh! no: for there are many things which I do not know.--Then if there be anything which you do not know, _you are not knowing_?--Yes, doubtless--of that particular thing.--Still you are _not knowing_: and just now you said that you were _knowing_: and thus, at one and the same time, you are what you are, and you are not what you are.[49] [Footnote 49: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 293 C. Aristotle considers _know_ to be an equivocal word; he admits that in certain senses you may both _know_ and _not know_ the same thing. Anal. Prior. ii. 67, b. 8. Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 25.]