[Footnote 53: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 298. Some of the fallacies in the dialogue ([Greek: Po/teron o(rô=sin oi( a)/nthrôpoi ta\ dunata\ o(ra=|n ê)\ ta\ a)du/nata? . . . Ê)= ou)ch oi(=o/n te sigô=nta le/gein?] p. 300 A) are hardly translatable into English, since they depend upon equivocal constructions peculiar to the Greek language. Aristotle refers them to the general head [Greek: par' a)mphiboli/an]. The same about [Greek: prosê/kei to\n ma/geiron katako/ptein], p. 301 D.] You have got a dog (Euthydêmus says to Ktesippus).--Yes.--The dog is the father of puppies?--Yes.--The dog, being a father, is yours?--Certainly.--Then your father is a dog, and you are brother of the puppies. You beat your dog sometimes? Then you beat your father.[54] [Footnote 54: Plat. Euthyd. p. 298.] Those animals, and those alone are _yours_ (sheep, oxen, &c.), which you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. But Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê are _your_ Gods. The Gods have a soul and are animals. Therefore your Gods are your animals. Now you told us that those alone were your animals, which you could give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. Therefore you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure, Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê.[55] [Footnote 55: Plat. Euthydêm. p. 302. This same fallacy, in substance, is given by Aristotle, De Sophist. El. 17, 176 a. 3, 179, a. 5, but with different exemplifying names and persons.] This fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal meaning of _yours_--one of its different explanations being treated as if it were the only one. [Side-note: Fallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible.] Other puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper:--Contradiction is impossible--To speak falsely is impossible.[56] These paradoxes were maintained by Antisthenes and others, and appear to have been matters of dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third centuries. I shall say more of them when I speak about the Megarics and Antisthenes. Here I only note, that in this dialogue, Ktesippus is represented as put to silence by them, and Sokrates as making an answer which is no answer at all.[57] We see how much trouble these paradoxes gave to Plato, when we read the Sophistês, in which he handles the last of the two in a manner elaborate, but (to my judgment) unsatisfactory. [Footnote 56: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 285-286.] [Footnote 57: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 286 B--287 A.] [Side-note: Plato's Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to set out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd.]