Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
[Footnote 61: See the instructive and original chapter on the
generation, sources, and growth of Belief, in Mr. Bain's work,
'Emotions and Will,' p. 568 seq. After laying down the fundamental
characteristic of Belief, as referable altogether to intended action,
either certain to come, or contingent under supposed circumstances,
and after enumerating the different Sources of Belief.--1. Intuitive
or Instinctive. 2. Experience. 3. The Influence of the Emotions
(sect. x. p. 579)--Mr. Bain says: "Having in our constitution
primordial fountains of activity in the spontaneous and voluntary
impulses, we follow the first clue that experience gives us, and
accept the indication with the whole force of these natural
promptings. Being under the strongest impulses to act somehow, an
animal accepts any lead that is presented, and if successful, abides
by that lead with unshaken confidence. This is that instinct of
credulity so commonly attributed to the infant mind. It is not the
single instance, or the repetition of two or three, that makes up the
strong tone of confidence; it is the mind's own active determination,
finding some definite vent in the gratification of its ends, and
abiding by the discovery with the whole energy of the character,
until the occurrence of some check, failure, or contradiction. The
force of belief, therefore, is not one rising from zero to a full
development by slow degrees, according to the length of the
experience. We must treat it rather as a strong primitive
manifestation, derived from the natural activity of the system, and
taking its direction and rectification from experience (p. 583). The
anticipation of nature, so strenuously repudiated by Bacon, is the
offspring of this characteristic of the mental system. With the
active tendency at its maximum, and the exercise of intelligence and
acquired knowledge at the minimum, there can issue nothing but a
quantity of rash enterprises. The respectable name
_generalisation_, implying the best products of enlightened
scientific research, has also a different meaning, expressing one of
the most erroneous impulses and crudest determinations of untutored
human nature. To extend some familiar and narrow experience, so as to
comprehend cases the most distant, is a piece of mere reckless
instinct, demanding severe discipline for its correction. I have
mentioned the case of our supposing all other minds constituted like
our own. The veriest infant has got this length in the career of
fallacy. Sound belief, instead of being a pacific and gentle growth,
is in reality the battering of a series of strongholds, the
conquering of a country in hostile occupation. This is a fact common
both to the individual and to the race. Observation is unanimous on
the point. It will probably be long ere the last of the delusions
attributable to this method of believing first and proving afterwards
can be eradicated from humanity." [3rd ed., p. 505 seq.]]