Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
[Footnote 63: The Platonic critics talk about the Eristics (as they
do about the Sophists) as if that name designated a known and
definite class of persons. This is altogether misleading. The term is
vituperative, and was applied by different persons according to their
own tastes.
Ueberweg remarks with great justice, that Isokrates called all
speculators on philosophy by the name of Eristics. "Als ob jener
Rhetor nicht (wie ja doch Spengel selbst gut nachgewiesen hat) alle
und jede Spekulation mit dem Nahmen der Eristik bezeichnete."
(Untersuchungen über die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schriften, p. 257.) In
reference to the distinction which Aristotle attempts to draw between
Dialectic and Eristic--the former legitimate, the latter
illegitimate--we must remark that even in the legitimate Dialectic
the purpose prominent in his mind is that of victory over an
opponent. He enjoins that you are not only to guard against your
opponent, lest he should out-manoeuvre you, but you are to conceal
and disguise the sequence of your questions so as to out-manoeuvre
him. [Greek: Chrê\ d' o(/per phula/ttesthai paragge/llomen
a)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.]
Anal. Prior. ii. 66, a. 32. Compare Topic. 108, a. 25, 156, a. 23,
164, b. 35.]
[Side-note: Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could
not have composed his Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De
Sophisticis Elenchis.]
Without the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at
Athens, Plato could not have composed his Euthydêmus, exhibiting a
_reductio ad absurdum_ of several verbal fallacies--nor could we
have had the logical theories of Aristotle, embodied in the
Analytica and Topica with its annexed treatise De Sophisticis
Elenchis, in which various fallacies are discriminated and
classified. These theories, and the corollaries connected with them,
do infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of Aristotle: but
he could not have conceived them without previous study of the
ratiocinative process. He, as the first theorizer, must have had
before him abundant arguments explicitly laid out, and contested, or
open to be contested, at every step by an opponent.[64] Towards such
habit of formal argumentation, a strong repugnance was felt by many
of the Athenian public, as there is among modern readers generally:
but those who felt thus, had probably little interest in the
speculations either of Plato or of Aristotle. That the Platonic
critics should themselves feel this same repugnance, seems to me not
consistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and
logician of antiquity: nor can I at all subscribe to their view, when
they present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as
factitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate, and by
the rapacity of Protagoras, Prodikus, and others.