Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
The second portion of Plato's theory, advanced to explain what virtue
is, presents nothing more satisfactory. Virtue is useful or
profitable: but neither health, strength, beauty, wealth, power,
&c., are profitable, unless rightly used: nor are justice,
moderation, courage, quick apprehension, good memory, &c.,
profitable, unless they are accompanied and guided by knowledge or
prudence.[35] Now if by _profitable_ we have reference not to
the individual agent alone, but to other persons concerned also, the
proposition is true, but not instructive or distinct. For what is
meant by _right use_? To what ends are the gifts here enumerated
to be turned, in order to constitute right use? What again is meant
by _knowledge_? knowledge of what?[36] This is a question put by
Sokrates in many other dialogues, and necessary to be put here also.
Moreover, knowledge is a term which requires to be determined, not
merely to some assignable object, but also in its general import,
no less than virtue. We shall come presently to an elaborate
dialogue (Theætêtus) in which Plato makes many attempts to determine
knowledge generally, but ends in a confessed failure. Knowledge must
be knowledge _possessed by some one_, and must be knowledge of
_something_. What is it, that a man must know, in order that his
justice or courage may become profitable? Is it pleasures and pains,
with their causes, and the comparative magnitude of each (as Sokrates
declares in the Protagoras), in order that he may contribute to
diminish the sum of pains, increase that of pleasures, to himself or
to the society? If this be what he is required to know, Plato should
have said so--or if not, what else--in order that the requirement of
knowledge might be made an intelligible condition.
[Footnote 35: Plato, Menon, pp. 87-88.]
[Footnote 36: See Republic, vi. p. 505 B, where this question is put,
but not answered, respecting [Greek: phro/nêsis].]
[Side-note: Subject of Menon; same as that of the
Protagoras--diversity of handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a
question and get rid of it.]