Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
It is true, indeed (as Schleiermacher observes), that the questions
put by Sokrates to this youth are in great proportion leading
questions, suggesting their own answers. They would not have served
their purpose unless they had been such. The illustration here
furnished, of the Sokratic interrogatory process, is highly
interesting, and his theory is in a great degree true.[43] Not all
learning, but an important part of learning, consists in
reminiscence--not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent
life, but of past experience and judgments in this life. Of such
experience and judgments every one has travelled through a large
course; which has disappeared from his memory, yet not irrevocably.
Portions of it may be revived, if new matter be presented to the
mind, fitted to excite the recollection of them by the laws of
association. By suitable interrogations, a teacher may thus recall to
the memory of his pupils many facts and judgments which have been
hitherto forgotten: he may bring into juxtaposition those which have
never before been put together in the mind: and he may thus make them
elicit instructive comparisons and inferences. He may provoke the
pupils to strike out new results for themselves, or to follow, by
means of their own stock of knowledge, in the path suggested by the
questions. He may farther lead them to perceive the fallacy of
erroneous analogies which at first presented themselves as plausible;
and to become painfully sensible of embarrassment and perplexing
ignorance, before he puts those questions which indicate the way of
escape from it. Upon the necessity of producing such painful
consciousness of ignorance Plato insists emphatically, as is his
custom.[44]
[Footnote 43: Plutarch (Fragment. [Greek: Peri\ psuchê=s]). Ei) a)ph'
e(te/rou e(/teron e)nnoou=men? ou)k a)/n, ei) mê\ proe/gnôsto. To\
e)pichei/rêma Platôniko/n. Ei) prosti/themen to\ e)/lleipon toi=s
ai)sthêtoi=s?--kai\ au)to\ Platôniko/n.]
Plutarch, in the same fragment, indicates some of the objections made
by Bion and Straton against the doctrine of [Greek: a)na/mnêsis]. How
(they asked) does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often
what is false or absurd? (asked Bion). If such reminiscence exists
(asked Straton) how comes it that we require demonstrations to
conduct us to knowledge? and how is it that no man can play on the
flute or the harp without practice?
[Greek: O(/ti Bi/ôn ê)po/rei peri\ tou= pseu/dous, ei) kai\ au)to\
kat' a)na/mnêsin, ô(s to\ e)nanti/on ge, ê)\ ou)/? kai\ ti/ ê(
a)logi/a? O(/ti Stra/tôn ê)po/rei, ei) e)/stin a)namnêsis, pô=s
a)/neu a)podei/xeôn ou) gigno/metha e)pistê/mones? pô=s de\ ou)dei\s
au)lêtê\s ê)\ kitharistê\s ge/gonen a)/neu mele/tês?]]