Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
Plato does not intend here to distinguish (as many modern writers
distinguish) geometry from other sciences, as if geometry were known
_à priori_, and other sciences known _à posteriori_ or from
experience. He does not suppose that geometrical truths are such that
no man can possibly believe the contrary of them; or that they are
different in this respect from the truths of any other science. He
here maintains that all the sciences lie equally in the untaught
mind,[45] but buried, forgotten, and confused: so as to require the
skill of the questioner not merely to recall them into consciousness,
but to disentangle truth from error. Far from supposing that the
untaught mind has a natural tendency to answer correctly geometrical
questions, he treats erroneous answers as springing up more naturally
than true answers, and as requiring a process of painful exposure
before the mind can be put upon the right track. The questioner,
without possessing any knowledge himself, (so Plato thinks,) can
nevertheless exercise an influence at once stimulating, corrective,
and directive. He stimulates the action of the associative process,
to call up facts, comparisons, and analogies, bearing on the
question: he arrests the respondent on a wrong answer, creating
within him a painful sense of ignorance and embarrassment: he directs
him by his subsequent questions into the path of right answers. His
obstetric aid (to use the simile in Plato's Theætetus), though
presupposing the pregnancy of the respondent mind, is indispensable
both to forward the childbirth, and to throw away any offspring which
may happen to be deformed. In the Theætetus, the main stress is laid
on that part of the dialogue which is performed by the questioner: in
the Menon, upon the latent competence and large dead stock of an
untaught respondent.
[Footnote 45: Plato, Menon, p. 85 E. [Greek: ou(=tos ga\r] (the
untaught slave) [Greek: poiê/sei peri\ pa/sês geômetri/as tau)ta\
tau=ta, kai\ tô=n a)/llôn mathêma/tôn a(pa/ntôn.]]
The mind of the slave questioned by Sokrates is discovered to be
pregnant. Though he has received no teaching from any professed
geometer, he is nevertheless found competent, when subjected to a
skilful interrogatory, to arrive at last, through a series of
mistakes, at correct answers, determining certain simple
problems of geometry. He knows nothing about geometry:
nevertheless there exist in his mind true opinions respecting that
which he does not know. These opinions are "called up like a dream"
by the interrogatories: which, if repeated and diversified, convert
the opinions into knowledge, taken up by the respondent out of
himself.[46] The opinions are inherited from an antecedent life and
born with him, since they have never been taught to him during this
life.