To this Sokrates objects: The suitable, or becoming, is what causes objects to _appear_ beautiful--not what causes them to _be really_ beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking. The two conditions do not always go together. Those objects, institutions, and pursuits which _are really_ beautiful (fine, honourable) very often do not appear so, either to individuals or to cities collectively; so that there is perpetual dispute and fighting on the subject. The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it is certainly what makes objects appear beautiful, so it cannot be what makes them really beautiful.[20] [Footnote 20: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E.] [Side-note: 2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold.] 2. The useful or profitable.--We call objects beautiful, looking to the purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve: the human body, with a view to running, wrestling, and other exercises--a horse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from them--implements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for music and other arts all upon the same principle, looking to the end which they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are characterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name Beautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is useful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is useless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.[21] [Footnote 21: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-D.] Now that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for such end: that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore capacity, or power, which is beautiful: incapacity, or impotence, is ugly.[22] [Footnote 22: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ dunato\n e(/kaston a)perga/zesthai, ei)s o(/per dunato/n, ei)s tou=to kai\ chrê/simon; to\ de\ a)du/naton a)/chrêston? . . . . Du/namis me\n a)/ra kalo/n--a)dunami/a de\ ai)schro/n?]] Most certainly (replies Hippias): this is especially true in our cities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing possible, political impotence, the meanest. Yet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will not hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad purposes: and each man, through such employment of his power, does much more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power, which is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called beautiful.[23] [Footnote 23: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D.]