[Footnote 73: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19. [Greek: tô=n de\ dê\ tou\s phi/lous e)xapatô/ntôn e)pi\ blabê=| (i(/na mêde\ tou=to paralei/pômen a)/skepton) po/teros a)dikô/tero/s e)stin, o( e(kô\n ê)\ o( a)/kôn?] The natural meaning of [Greek: e)pi\ blabê=|] would be, "for the purpose of mischief"; and Schneider, in his Index, gives "nocendi causâ". But in that meaning the question would involve an impossibility, for the words [Greek: o( a)/kôn] exclude any such purpose.] [Footnote 74: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19-22.] This is the same view which is worked out by the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Minor: beginning with the antithesis between the veracious and mendacious man (as Sokrates begins in Xenophon); and concluding with the general result--that it belongs to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly. [Side-note: Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it.] Aristotle,[75] in commenting upon this doctrine of the Hippias Minor, remarks justly, that Plato understands the epithets _veracious_ and _mendacious_ in a sense different from that which they usually bear. Plato understands the words as designating one who _can_ tell the truth if he chooses--one who _can_ speak falsely if he chooses: and in this sense he argues plausibly that the two epithets go together, and that no man can be mendacious unless he be also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their received meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the habitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is doubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the applicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the applicability of both epithets: but the distinction, which they are intended to draw, regards the intentions and dispositions with which the power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato's conclusion--"He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that does wrong unwillingly," is falsely collected from induction or analogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon which the argument is built, is not applicable. _Better_ has reference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions and habitual intentions; though it presupposes a certain state and amount of intelligence as indispensable. [Footnote 75: Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 8; compare Ethic. Nikomach. iv. p. 1127, b. 16.] [Side-note: Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct.]