the two as radically distinct and unconnected. The one was absolute, eternal, unchangeable, homogeneous, apprehended only by reason. The other was relative, temporary, variable, heterogeneous; a world of individual and subjective opinion, upon which no absolute truth, no pure objectivity, could be reached. [Footnote 2: I have already given a short account of the Zenonian Dialectic, ch. ii. p. 93 seq.] [Side-note: Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them.] Sokrates, depicted here as a young man, impugns this doctrine of Zeno: and maintains that the two worlds, though naturally disjoined, were not incommunicable. He advances the Platonic theory of Ideas: that is, an intelligible world of many separate self-existent Forms or Ideas, apprehended by reason only--and a sensible world of particular objects, each participating in one or more of these Forms or Ideas. "What you say (he remarks to Zeno), is true of the world of Forms or Ideas: the Form of Likeness _per se_ can never be unlike, nor can the Form of Unlikeness be ever like. But in regard to the sensible world, there is nothing to hinder you and me, and other objects which rank and are numbered as separate individuals, from participating both in the Form of likeness and in the Form of unlikeness.[3] In so far as I, an individual object, participate in the Form of Likeness, I am properly called like; in so far as I participate in the Form of Unlikeness, I am called unlike. So about One and Many, Great and Little, and so forth: I, the same individual, may participate in many different and opposite Forms, and may derive from them different and opposite denominations. I am one and many--like and unlike--great and little--all at the same time. But no such combination is possible between the Forms themselves, self-existent and opposite: the Form of Likeness cannot become unlike, nor _vice versâ_. The Forms themselves stand permanently apart, incapable of fusion or coalescence with each other: but different and even opposite Forms may lend themselves to participation and partnership in the same sensible individual object."[4] [Footnote 3: Plato, Parmenid. p. 129 A. [Greek: ou) nomi/zeis ei)=nai au)to\ kath' au)to\ ei)=do/s ti o(moio/têtos, kai\ tô=| toiou/tô| ai)= a)/llo ti e)nanti/on, o(\ e)/stin a)no/moion? tou/toin de\ duoi=n o)/ntoin kai\ e)me\ kai\ se\ kai\ ta\ a)/lla a(\ dê\ polla\ kalou=men, metalamba/nein?]] [Footnote 4: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 129-130.] [Side-note: Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates. Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas.]