Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Plato · en
The subversion of such a democracy arises from the men who rise to
be popular leaders in it: violent, ambitious, extravagant, men,
who gain the favour of the people by distributing among them
confiscations from the property of the rich. The rich, resisting
these injustices, become enemies to the constitution: the people,
in order to put them down, range themselves under the banners of
the most energetic popular leader, who takes advantage of such a
position to render himself a despot.[273] He begins his rule by
some acceptable measures, such as abolition of debts, and
assignment of lands to the poorer citizens, until he has expelled
or destroyed the parties opposed to him. He seeks pretences for
foreign war, in order that the people may stand in need of a
leader, and may be kept poor by the contributions necessary to
sustain war. But presently he finds, or suspects, dissatisfaction
among the more liberal spirits. He kills or banishes them as
enemies: and to ensure the continuance of his rule, he is under
the necessity of dispatching in like manner every citizen
prominent either for magnanimity, intelligence, or wealth.[274]
Becoming thus odious to all the better citizens, he is obliged
to seek support by enlisting a guard of mercenary foreigners and
manumitted slaves. He cannot pay his guards, without plundering
the temples, extorting perpetual contributions from the people,
and grinding them down by severe oppression and suffering.[275]
Such is the government of the despot, which Euripides and other
poets employ their genius in extolling.[276]
[Footnote 273: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 565-566.]
[Footnote 274: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 567 B.]
[Footnote 275: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 568-569.]
[Footnote 276: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 568 B.]
[Side-note: Despotic individual corresponding to that
city.]