It is remarkable that while the Xenophontic Sokrates cites these verses from Hesiod as illustrating and enforcing the drift of his exhortation, the Platonic Sokrates cites them as misleading, and as a specimen of the hurtful errors instilled by the poets (Republic, ii. p. 364 D).] We see thus that the doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates impugns in the Republic, is countenanced elsewhere by Sokratic authority. It is, in my judgment, more true than that which he opposes to it. The exhortations and orders of parents to their children, which he condemns--were founded upon views of fact and reality more correct than those which the Sokrates of the Republic would substitute in place of them. [Side-note: Argument of Sokrates to refute them. Sentiments in which it originates. Panegyric on Justice.] Let us note the sentiment in which Plato's creed here originates. He desires, above every thing, to stand forward as the champion and panegyrist of justice--as the enemy and denouncer of injustice. To praise justice, not in itself, but for its consequences--and to blame injustice in like manner--appears to him disparaging and insulting to justice.[11] He is not satisfied with showing that the just man benefits others by his justice, and that the unjust man hurts others by his injustice: he admits nothing into his calculation, except happiness or misery to the agent himself: and happiness, moreover, inherent in the process of just behaviour--misery inherent in the process of unjust behaviour--whatever be the treatment which the agent may receive from either Gods or men. Justice _per se_ (affirms Plato) is the cause of happiness to the just agent, absolutely and unconditionally: injustice, in like manner, of misery to the unjust--_quand même_--whatever the consequences may be either from men or Gods. This is the extreme strain of panegyric suggested by Plato's feeling, and announced as a conclusion substantiated by his reasons. Nothing more thoroughgoing can be advanced in eulogy of justice. "Neither the eastern star nor the western star is so admirable"--to borrow a phrase from Aristotle.[12] [Footnote 11: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 368 B-C. [Greek: de/doika ga\r mê\ ou)d' o(/sion ê)=| parageno/menon dikaiosu/nê| kakêgoroume/nê| a)pagoreu/ein kai\ mê\ boêthei=n], &c.] [Footnote 12: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. v. 3 (1), 1129, b. 28. [Greek: ou)/th' e(/speros ou)/th' e(ô=|os ou(/tô thaumasto/s.]] Plato is here the first proclaimer of the doctrine afterwards so much insisted on by the Stoics--the all-sufficiency of virtue to the happiness of the virtuous agent, whatever may be his fate in other respects--without requiring any farther conditions or adjuncts. It will be seen that Plato maintains this thesis with reference to the terms _justice_ and its opposite _injustice_; sometimes (though not often) using the general term _virtue_ or wisdom, which was the ordinary term with the Stoics afterwards.