Now upon this we may observe, that Plato, from anxiety to escape corollaries which are only partially true, and which, in so far as they are true, may be obviated by precautions--has endeavoured to accredit a fiction misrepresenting the constant phenomena and standing conditions of social life. Among those conditions, reciprocity of services is one of the most fundamental. The difference of feeling which attaches to the services which a man renders, called duties or obligations--and the services which he receives from others, called his rights--is alike obvious and undeniable. Each individual has both duties and rights: each is both an agent towards others, and a patient or sentient from others. He is required to be just towards others, they are required to be just towards him: he in his actions must have regard, within certain limits, to their comfort and security--they in their actions must have regard to his. If he has obligations towards them, he has also rights against them; or (which is the same thing) they have obligations towards him. If punishment is requisite to deter him from doing wrong to them, it is equally requisite to deter them from doing wrong to him. Whoever theorises upon society, contemplating it as a connected scheme or system including different individual agents, must accept this reciprocity as a fundamental condition. The rights and obligations, of each towards the rest, must form inseparable and correlative parts of the theory. Each agent must be dealt with by others according to his works, and must be able to reckon beforehand on being so dealt with:--on escaping injury or hurt, and receiving justice, from others, if he behaves justly towards them. The theory supposes, that whether just or unjust, he will appear to others what he really is, and will be appreciated accordingly.[25] [Footnote 25: Euripid. Herakleid. 425. [Greek: Ou) ga\r turanni/d', ô(/ste barba/rôn, e)/chô, A)ll', ê)\n di/kaia drô=, di/kaia pei/somai.] In a remarkable passage of the Laws, Plato sets a far higher value upon correct estimation from others, which in the Republic he depicts under the contemptuous appellation of show or seeming. Plato, Legg. xii. p. 950 B. [Greek: Chrê\ de\ ou)/pote peri\ smikrou= poiei=sthai to\ dokei=n a)gathou\s ei)=nai toi=s a)/llois ê)\ mê\ dokei=n; ou) ga\r o(/son ou)si/as a)retê=s a)pesphalme/noi tugcha/nousin oi( polloi/, tosou=ton kai\ tou= kri/nein tou\s a)/llous oi( ponêroi\ kai\ a)/chrêstoi, thei=on de/ ti kai\ eu)/stocho/n e)sti kai\ toi=s kakoi=s. ô(/ste pa/mpolloi kai\ tô=n spho/dra kakô=n eu)= toi=s lo/gois kai\ tai=s do/xais diairou=ntai tou\s a)mei/nous tô=n a)nthrô/pôn kai\ tou\s chei/rous. Dio\ kalo\n tai=s pollai=s po/lesi to\ parake/leusma/ e)sti, protima=|n tê\n eu)doxi/an pro\s tô=n pollô=n; to\ me\n ga\r o)rtho/taton kai\ me/giston, o)/nta a)gatho\n a)lêthô=s ou(/tô to\n eu)/doxon bi/on thêreu/ein--chôri\s de\ mêdamô=s, to/n ge te/leon a)/ndra e)so/menon.]]