its ulterior consequences. 3. That which we choose on both grounds, both as immediately attractive and as ultimately beneficial), it belongs to the last variety: whereas the opponents whom he impugns referred it to the second. [Footnote 36: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 B. [Greek: ei) ga\r mê\ a)phairê/seis e(kate/rôthen] (_i.e._ both from justice and from injustice) [Greek: ta\s a)lêthei=s, ta\s de\ pseudei=s prosthê/seis, ou) to\ di/kaion phê/somen e)painei=n se, a)lla\ to\ dokei=n, ou)de\ to\ a)/dikon ei)=nai pse/gein, a)lla\ to\ dokei=n, kai\ parakeleu/esthai a)/dikon o)/nta lantha/nein], &c.] [Side-note: Statement of the real issue between him and his opponents.] Here the point at issue between the two sides is expressly set forth. Both admit that Justice is a Bonum--both of them looking at the case with reference only to the agent himself. But the opponents contend, that it is Bonum (with reference to the agent) only through its secondary effects, and noway Bonum or attractive in its primary working: being thus analogous to medical treatment or gymnastic discipline, which men submit to only for the sake of ulterior benefits. On the contrary, Plato maintained that it is good both in its primary and secondary effects: good by reason of the ulterior benefits which it confers, but still better and more attractive in its direct and primary effect: thus combining the pleasurable and the useful, like a healthy constitution and perfect senses. Both parties agree in recognising justice as a good: but they differ in respect of the grounds on which, and the mode in which, it is good. [Side-note: He himself misrepresents this issue--he describes his opponents as enemies of justice.] Such is the issue as here announced by Plato himself: and the announcement deserves particular notice because the Platonic Sokrates afterwards, in the course of his argument, widens and misrepresents the issue: ascribing to his opponents the invidious post of enemies who defamed justice and recommended injustice, while he himself undertakes to counterwork the advocates of injustice, and to preserve justice from unfair calumny[37]--thus professing to be counsel for Justice _versus_ Injustice. Now this is not a fair statement of the argument against which Sokrates is contending. In that argument, justice was admitted to be a Good, but was declared to be a Good of that sort which is laborious and irksome to the agent in the primary proceedings required from him--though highly beneficial and indispensable to him by reason of its ulterior results: like medicine, gymnastic discipline, industry,[38] &c. Whether this doctrine be correct or not, those who hold it cannot be fairly described as advocates of injustice and enemies of Justice:[39] any more than they are enemies of medicine, gymnastic discipline, industry, &c., which they recommend as good and indispensable, on the same grounds as they recommend justice.