It will be recollected that this second line of argument is the same as that which Glaukon described as adopted by parents and by other monitors, in discourse with pupils. Plato therefore here admits that their exhortations were founded on solid grounds; though he blames them for denying or omitting the announcement, that just behaviour conferred happiness upon the agent by its own efficacy, apart from all consequences. He regards the happiness attained by the just man, through the consequent treatment by men and Gods, as real indeed,--but as only supplemental and secondary, inferior in value to the happiness involved in the just behaviour _per se_. In this part of the argument, too, as well as in the former, we are forced to lament the equivocal meaning of the word _justice_: and to recollect the observation of Plato at the close of the first book, that those who do not know what justice is, can never determine what is to be truly predicated of it, and what is not.[51] If by the just man he means the philosopher, and by the unjust man the person who is not a philosopher,--he has himself told us before, that in societies as actually constituted, the philosopher enjoys the minimum of social advantages, and is even condemned to a life of insecurity; while the unphilosophical men (at least a certain variety of them) obtain sympathy, esteem, and promotion.[52] [Footnote 51: Plato, Republic, i. p. 354 B.] [Footnote 52: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 492-494-495-497.] Now in this second line of argument, Plato holds a totally different language respecting the way in which the just man is treated by society. He even exaggerates, beyond what can be reasonably expected, the rewards accruing to the just man: who (Plato tells us), when he has become advanced in life and thoroughly known, acquires command in his own city if he chooses it, and has his choice among the citizens for the best matrimonial alliances: while the unjust man ends in failure and ignominy, incurring the hatred of every one and suffering punishment.[53] This is noway consistent with Plato's previous description of the position of the philosopher in actual society: yet nevertheless his argument identifies the just man with the philosopher. [Footnote 53: Plato, Republic, x. p. 613 D-E.] [Side-note: Dependence of the happiness of the individual on the society in which he is placed.]