Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Plato · en
[Footnote 180: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 538 D-539. [Greek: o(/tan
to\n ou(/tôs e)/chonta e)ltho\n e)rô/têma e)/rêtai, ti/ e)sti
to\ kalo/n, kai\ a)pokrina/menon o(\ tou= nomothetou= ê)/kouen
e)xelegchê=| o( lo/gos, kai\ polla/kis kai\ pollachê=
e)le/gchôn ei)s do/xan katabalê=| ô(s tou=to ou)de\n ma/llon
kalo\n ê)\ ai)schro\n, kai\ peri\ dikai/ou ô(sau/tôs kai\
a)di/kou, kai\ a(\ ma/lista ê)=gen e)n timê=|], &c.]
[Footnote 181: Plato, Repub. vii. p. 539 B.]
Accordingly, we must not admit (says Plato) either young men, or
men of ordinary untrained minds, to dialectic debate. We must
admit none but mature persons, of sedate disposition, properly
prepared: who will employ it not for mere disputation, but for the
investigation of truth.[182]
[Footnote 182: Plato, Repub. vii. p. 539 D.]
[Side-note: Contradiction with the spirit of other
dialogues--Parmenidês, &c.]
Now the doctrine thus proclaimed, with the grounds upon which it
rests--That dialectic debate is unsuitable and prejudicial to
young men--distinctly contradict both the principles laid down by
himself elsewhere, and the frequent indications of his own
dialogues: not to mention the practice of Sokrates as described by
Xenophon. In the Platonic Parmenidês, and Theætêtus, the season
of youth is expressly pronounced to be that in which dialectic
exercise is not merely appropriate, but indispensable to the
subsequent attainment of truth.[183] Moreover, Plato puts into the
mouth of Parmenides a specimen intentionally given to represent
that dialectic exercise which will be profitable to youth. The
specimen is one full of perplexing, though ingenious,
subtleties: ending in establishing, by different trains of
reasoning, the affirmative, as well as the negative, of several
distinct conclusions. Not only it supplies no new positive
certainty, but it appears to render any such consummation more
distant and less attainable than ever.[184] It is therefore
eminently open to the censure which Plato pronounces, in the
passage just cited from his Republic, against dialectic as
addressed to young men. The like remark may be made upon the
numerous other dialogues (though less extreme in negative subtlety
than the Parmenidês), wherein the Platonic Sokrates interrogates
youths (or interrogates others, in the presence of youths) without
any positive result: as in the Theætêtus, Charmidês, Lysis,
Alkibiadês, Hippias, &c., to which we may add the
conversations of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydemus and
others.[185]
[Footnote 183: Plato, Parmenidês, pp. 135 D, 137 B. Theætêt. 146
A.