Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Plato · en
The first requisite for a philosopher (replies Sokrates) is, that
he shall love and pursue eagerly every sort of knowledge or
wisdom, without shrinking from labour for such purpose. But it is
not sufficient that he should be eager about hearing tragedies or
learning the minor arts. Other men, accomplished and curious, are
fond of hearing beautiful sounds and discourses, or of seeing
beautiful forms and colours. But the philosopher alone can see or
distinguish truth.[146] It is only he who can distinguish the
genuine Form or Idea, in which truth consists, from the particular
embodiments in which it occurs. These Forms or Ideas exist,
eternal and unchangeable. Since Pulchrum is the opposite of Turpe,
they must be two, and each of them must be One: the same about
Just and Unjust, Good and Evil; each of these is a distinct Form
or Idea, existing as One and Unchangeable by itself, but
exhibiting itself in appearance as manifold, diverse, and
frequently changing, through communion with different objects and
events, and through communion of each Form with others.[147] Now
the accomplished, but unphilosophical, man cannot see or recognise
this Form in itself. He can see only the different particular
cases and complications in which it appears embodied.[148] None
but the philosopher can contemplate each Form by itself, and
discriminate it from the various particulars in conjunction with
which it appears. Such philosophers are few in number, but they
are the only persons who can be said truly to live. Ordinary and
even accomplished men--who recognise beautiful things, but
cannot recognise Beauty in itself, nor even follow an instructor
who points it out to them--pass their lives in a sort of dream or
reverie: for the dreamer, whether asleep or awake, is one who
believes what is similar to another thing to be not merely
similar, but to be the actual thing itself.[149] The philosopher
alone, who embraces in his mind the one and unchangeable Form or
Idea, along with, yet distinguished from, its particular
embodiments, possesses knowledge or science. The unphilosophical
man, whose mind embraces nothing higher than variable particulars,
does not know--but only opines, or has opinions.[150]
[Footnote 146: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 474-475. [Greek: tou\s tê=s
a)lêthei/as philothea/monas] (p. 475 E).]
[Footnote 147: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 A. [Greek: E)peidê/
e)stin e)nanti/on kalo\n ai)schrô=|, du/o au)tô\ ei)=nai . . .
Ou)kou=n e)peidê\ du/o, kai\ e(\n e)ka/teron? . . . Kai\ peri\
dikai/ou kai\ a)di/kou kai\ a)gathou= kai\ kakou= kai\ pa/ntôn
tô=n ei)dô=n pe/ri, o( au)to\s lo/gos, au)to\ me\n e(\n e(/kaston
ei)=nai, tê=| de\ tô=n pra/xeôn kai\ sôma/tôn kai\ a)llê/lôn
koinôni/a| pantachou= phantazo/mena polla\ phai/nesthai
e(/kaston?]]
[Footnote 148: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]
[Footnote 149: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]