The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato · en
20. Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the Phaedo. The
first may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state
of being. Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is
seeking to withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the
things of the world, and to find his higher self. Plato recognizes in
these aspirations the foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in
modern times have argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind,
the other from the progress of the soul towards perfection. In using
this argument Plato has certainly confused the soul which has left the
body, with the soul of the good and wise. (Cp. Rep. x. 611 C.) Such a
confusion was natural, and arose partly out of the antithesis of soul
and body. The soul in her own essence, and the soul ‘clothed upon’ with
virtues and graces, were easily interchanged with one another, because on
a subject which passes expression the distinctions of language can hardly
be maintained.
[Sidenote: _The immortality of the soul._]
21. The other ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived
from the necessity of retribution. The wicked would be too well off
if their evil deeds came to an end. It is not to be supposed that an
Ardiaeus, an Archelaus, an Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty
of their crimes in this world. The manner in which this retribution is
accomplished Plato represents under the figures of mythology. Doubtless
he felt that it was easier to improve than to invent, and that in
religion especially the traditional form was required in order to give
verisimilitude to the myth. The myth too is far more probable to that age
than to ours, and may fairly be regarded as ‘one guess among many’ about
the nature of the earth, which he cleverly supports by the indications of
geology. Not that he insists on the absolute truth of his own particular
notions: ‘no man of sense will be confident in such matters; but he will
be confident that something of the kind is true’ (114 D). As in other
passages (Gorg. 527 A, Tim. 29 D; cp. Crito, 107 B), he wins belief for
his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, like Dante
or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own creations.
* * * * *