The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato · en
But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what
in each case we acquired, then we must always have come
into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know
as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining
knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias,
just the losing of knowledge?
Quite true, Socrates.
[Sidenote: What is called learning therefore is only a recollection of
ideas which we possessed in a previous state.]
But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was
lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses
we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process
which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge
which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed
recollection?
Very true.
So much is clear—that when we perceive something, either 76
by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from
that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other
thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been
forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives
follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued
to know through life; or, after birth, those who are
said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.
Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.
And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we
the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things
which we knew previously to our birth?
I cannot decide at the moment.
At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge
will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge?
What do you say?
Certainly, he will.
[Sidenote: _The pre-existence of the soul._]
But do you think that every man is able to give an account
of these very matters about which we are speaking?
Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that
to-morrow, at this time, there will no longer be any one
alive who is able to give an account of them such as ought
to be given.
Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know
these things?
Certainly not.
They are in process of recollecting that which they learned
before?
Certainly.
But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since
we were born as men?
Certainly not.
And therefore, previously?
Yes.
[Sidenote: But if so, our souls must have existed before they were in the
form of man; or if not the souls, then not the ideas.]
Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without
bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have
had intelligence.
Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are
given us at the very moment of birth; for this is the only
time which remains.