The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato · en
Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at
three?
No.
[Sidenote: _Recapitulation._]
Then three has no part in the even?
None.
Then the triad or number three is uneven?
Very true.
[Sidenote: Natures may not be opposed, and yet may not admit of
opposites; e. g. three is not opposed to two, and yet does not admit the
even any more than two admits of the odd.]
To return then to my distinction of natures which are
not opposed, and yet do not admit opposites—as, in the
instance given, three, although not opposed to the even,
does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings
the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not
receive the odd, or fire the cold—from these examples (and 105
there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to
arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will
not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the
opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in
that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate—for
there is no harm in repetition. The number five will
not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which
is the double of five, will admit the nature of the odd. The
double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to
the odd, but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor
again will parts in the ratio 3:2, nor any fraction in which
there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, admit
the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to
the whole: You will agree?
Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.
[Sidenote: The merely verbal truth may be replaced by a higher one.]
And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you
answer my question in the words in which I ask it: let me
have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but
another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by
you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one
asks you ‘what that is, of which the inherence makes the
body hot,’ you will reply not heat (this is what I call the
safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer,
which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any one
asks you ‘why a body is diseased,’ you will not say from
disease, but from fever; and instead of saying that oddness
is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is
the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare
say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing
any further examples.
[Sidenote: _Application of the argument to the soul._]
Yes, he said, I quite understand you.
Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will
render the body alive?