The dialogues of Plato in five volumes, Vol. 2 (of 5) : $b Translated into English with analyses and introductions
Plato · en
In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his
interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the
main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe
rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to think,
with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus (177 C), that the
digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the
dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning
is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and references are
interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the whole. We
must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine
the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Cp.
Introduction to the Phaedrus.)
Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this
matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one
another by the slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite and
contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle
of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have applied his
method with the most various results. The value and use of the method has
been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them. Secondly, they
have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue;
in this way they think that they have escaped all difficulties, not
seeing that what they have gained in generality they have lost in truth
and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily pass into one another;
and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we can only realize by an
effort, imperceptibly blend with the more familiar theories of modern
philosophers. An eye for proportion is needed (his own art of measuring)
in the study of Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may readily
admit that the moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or the intellectual
antithesis of knowledge and opinion, being an appearance, are never far
off in a Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background,
we should not bring them into the foreground, or expect to discern them
equally in all the dialogues.
[Sidenote: _The subject of the Dialogue._]