The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
[75] I would particularly recommend this chapter to modern
mathematicians, most of whom, I am afraid, have never considered
whether or not the subjects of their speculation have any real
subsistence: though it is surely an enquiry worthy the earnest
attention of every liberal mind. For if the objects of mathematical
investigation are merely imaginary, I mean the point without parts,
the line without breadth, &c. the science, founded on these false
principles, must of course be entirely delusive. Indeed, an absolutely
true conclusion, can never flow from an erroneous principle, as from
its cause: as the stream must always participate of its source. I
mean such a conclusion as is demonstrated by the proper cause, πλὴν
οὐ διότι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι, says Aristotle, in his first Analytics; that is,
a syllogism from false principles will not prove the _why_, but
only simply _that it is_: indeed it can only simply prove _that
it is_, to him who admits the false propositions; because he who
allows the premises, cannot deny the conclusion, when the syllogism is
properly constructed. Thus we way syllogize in the first figure,
Every thing white, is an animal:
Every bird is white:
Therefore, Every bird is an animal.
And the conclusion will be true, though the major and minor terms are
false; but then these terms are not the causes of the conclusion, and
we have an inference without a proof. In like manner, if mathematical
species are delusive and fictitious, the conclusions deduced from them
as principles, are merely hypothetical, and not demonstrative.
[76] Aristotle, in his last Analytics. The reader will please to
observe, that the whole force of this nervous, accurate, and elegant
reasoning, is directed against Aristotle; who seems unfortunately to
have considered, with the moderns, that mathematical species subsist
in the soul, by an abstraction from sensibles. See the preceding
Dissertation.
[77] Viz. 1, 2, 4, 8, 3, 9, 27. Concerning which, see lib. iii. of
Proclus’s excellent Commentary on the Timæus.