The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
19. We have hitherto defended the impossibility of an infinite
progression of logical predicates and subjects, in a demonstrative
process, by such arguments as are dialectical and common: it now
remains that we adopt such as are peculiar and certain. Demonstrations,
then, are derived from affections essentially inherent in a subject;
and these are either such as take place in definitions of a subject,
as multitude and quantity, are essentially predicated of number; or,
secondly, accidents which are defined from their subjects, as imparity
by number. But the predication cannot, in either case, be extended to
infinity. For it is not necessary that in the same manner that imparity
is predicated of number, something else, suppose _c_, should be
predicated of imparity; and so imparity be contained in its definition,
similar to number in the definition of imparity. For in predications
of this kind, the terms are always assumed more contracted than their
subject; and at length, by a continued procession, must terminate in an
indivisible. Thus, as imparity is more contracted than number, _c_
must be more contracted than imparity. Hence, these predications either
finally stop, for the reasons we have assigned; or because whatever is
predicated of imparity, is necessarily predicated of number; so that
one thing as number would be actually contained in the definition of an
infinity of things; and so actual infinity must ensue, which is absurd.
Lastly, whatever is said to reside in the terms, must be allowed to
reside in the subject; so number must be applied in the definition
of every affection; and an infinite number of properties will be
essentially inherent in number; and number will inherit infinite
definitions. But affections essentially resident in a subject cannot
be infinite, because it is necessary they should exist in energy.
Thus, imparity cannot exist potentially in number; nor reason in man;
nor rotundity in a circle, because wherever these subjects have an
actual being, it is necessary these essential attributes should be
actually inherent. Again, in the definitions of a subject, an infinite
process is impossible, because from such an hypothesis nothing could
ever be defined; and thus it appears that neither can demonstrations
be infinitely extended, nor every thing admit of demonstration, an
opinion we have already noticed in the beginning of this section: for
if neither universally, nor in every proposition a middle term can
be assumed, but as soon as we arrive at immediate propositions, the
labour of investigation is finished, the possibility of demonstrating
every thing can no longer be defended; since it is proved above, that
by limiting the extremes, an infinite number of mediums is necessarily
excluded.