The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Plato · en
It is this which produces that delight
in the soul from sensible harmony, which sufficiently indicates it to
be something familiar and domestic to her nature. From hence it may
be inferred, that Plato is not inconsistent with himself when, in the
Phædo, he denies, and in the Timæus affirms, the soul to be harmony;
for he denies that it is a harmony of a definite quantity, or such as
arises from the parts of the body; but he asserts it to be a harmony
in the manner already explained. It may likewise be inferred, that
Plato is ignorantly accused by a many, for affirming that the soul is
harmony, or number; for they only regard vulgar mathematical number,
and sensible harmony; while Plato, far more elevated, discourses of
intelligible numbers, and ideal harmony, subsisting in immaterial
energy and perfection.
5. And here it is necessary to consider what number, in a particular
manner belongs to the soul; for various numbers, differently
considered, accord with her self-motive nature. In the first place,
union and unity may be considered in the soul, as in her proper degree
she participates of divine unity; and likewise with relation to her
totality, for she is one certain whole. And because _a whole_ may
be considered in a triple respect, one before the parts, another rising
from the aggregate of parts, and a third subsisting in the single
parts; the soul is a whole in each of these respects. Thus she is a
whole prior to the parts, while she is considered as divisible into
them, in an incorporeal manner; she is a whole rising from parts, while
assuming the parts in the first place, we consider how her nature is
fabricated from their conjunction; and she is a whole in the single
parts, since she is total in the whole, and in every part. Besides,
the duad belongs to the soul, because she contains in her nature bound
and infinite, sameness and difference; and lastly, a conversion to
intelligibles and sensibles. And, indeed, the duad conjoined with
unity, very properly accords with the soul; for to intellect above
soul, unity particularly belongs; to body beneath soul, the infinite
alone; and to soul situated in the middle, duality properly agrees,
being, as it were, infinite, connected with unity. Again, the ternary
number is attributed to the soul, as well on account of her beginning,
middle, and end, as because she abides in herself, proceeds to
inferiors, and returns to supernal natures. Besides, she flows from
_the one_, recedes from him, and is reflected into the one when
she acquires her proper perfection. Lastly, as Proclus observes, the
nature of the soul is divided into essence, power, and energy; so that
she may be said to rejoice in the ternary number, and to be replete
with its perfection. But the quaternary number belongs to the soul
so far as she is connected with matter, which is tempered with four
qualities, and four elements; and she is endued with four principal
faculties, nutrition, sensation, local motion, and intellection.