[Sidenote: Socrates, Cleitophon, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus.] Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus. {17} *340A* Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness. But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice. [Sidenote: Cleitophon tries to make a way of escape for Thrasymachus by inserting the words 'thought to be.'] Yes, Polemarchus,--Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just. Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest *340B* of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger. But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest,--this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice. Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus. *340C* Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not? [Sidenote: This evasion is repudiated by Thrasymachus;] Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken? Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken. [Sidenote: who adopts another line of defence: 'No artist or ruler is ever mistaken _qua_ artist or ruler.']