my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is *366B* what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony. [Sidenote: All this, even if not absolutely true, affords great excuse for doing wrong.] On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. *366C* Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears {46} justice praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also *366D* knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the truth--but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be. [Sidenote: Men should be taught that justice is in itself the greatest good and injustice the greatest evil.]