The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
If, however, this intellect is essentially intellect, since Timæus
indicating that the essence of intellect is the same with its
intellection, denominates it divine; for he says, that soul receiving
a divine intellect led an upright and wise life; if, therefore, this
be the case, it is necessary that the whole world should be suspended
from its divinity, and that motion indeed should be present to this
universe from soul, but that its perpetual permanency and sameness of
subsistence should be derived from intellect, and that its one union,
the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its all-perfect measure should
originate from that unity,[108] from which intellect is uniform, soul
is one,[109] every being is whole and perfect according to its own
nature, and every thing secondary together with perfection in its own
proper nature, participates of another more excellent peculiarity,
from an order which is always established above it. For that which is
corporeal being alter-motive, derives from soul the representation
of self-motive power, and is through it an animal. But soul being
self-motive participates of a life according to intellect, and
energizing according to time, possesses a never-ceasing energy, and
an ever-vigilant life from its proximity to intellect. And intellect
possessing its life in eternity, always subsisting essentially in
energy,[110] and fixing all its stable intellection at once in
intellect, is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. For it
has twofold energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others
as being inebriated with nectar. And elsewhere he observes, that this
intellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a
god; in the same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul, is
intellect; and as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul.
All things therefore, as we have said, are suspended from _the one_
through intellect and soul as media. And intellect indeed has the form
of unity; but soul has the form of intellect; and the body of the world
is vital. But every thing is conjoined with that which is prior to
itself. And of the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate,
but the other in a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And
divinity, indeed, is prior to intellect, being primarily carried in an
intellectual nature; but intellect is most divine, as being deified
prior to other things; and soul is divine, so far as it requires an
intellectual medium. But the body which participates of a soul of
this kind, so far as body indeed, is also itself divine; for the
illumination of divine[111] light pervades supernally as far as to the
last dependencies; yet it is not simply divine; but soul, by looking to
intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.