The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Plato about the providence of the Gods.
CHAPTER XIV.
From what has been said, therefore, it is evident to every one, that
the Gods being the causes of all motion, some of them are essential and
vivific, according to a self-motive, self-vital, and self-energetic
power. But others of them are intellectual, and excite by their very
being all secondary[114] natures to the perfection of life, according
to the fountain and principle of all second and third progressions of
motion. And others are unical, or characterized by unity, deifying
by participation all the whole genera of themselves, according to a
primary, all-perfect, and unknown power of energy, and who are the
leaders of one kind of motion, but are not the principle of another.
But again others supply to secondary natures motion according to place
or quality, but are essentially the causes of motion to themselves. For
every thing which is the cause of essence to other things is much prior
to this the cause to itself of its own proper energies and perfection.
Farther still, that which is self-motive is again the principle of
motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to every thing in
the world, and not local motion only and the other kinds of motion,
but the progression into being is from soul, and by a much greater
priority from an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the life
of self-motive natures and precedes according to cause all temporal
energy. And in a still greater degree do motion, being, and life
proceed from a unical hyparxis, which connectedly contains intellect
and soul, is the source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the
last of things. For of life indeed, not all the parts of the world
are capable of participating, nor of intellect and a gnostic power;
but of _the one_ all things participate, as far as to matter itself,
both wholes and parts, things which subsist according to nature, and
the contraries to these; and there is not any thing which is deprived
of a cause of this kind, nor can any thing ever participate of being,
if it is deprived of _the one_. If, therefore, the Gods produce all
things, and contain all things, in the unknown comprehensions of
themselves, how is it possible there should not be a providence of all
things in these comprehensions, pervading supernally as far as to the
most partial natures? For it is every where fit that offspring should
enjoy the providential care of their causes. But all alter-motive are
the progeny of self-motive natures. And things which subsist in time,
either in the whole of time, or in a part of it, are the effects of
eternal natures; because that which always is, is the cause of that
which sometimes exists. And divine and unical genera, as they give
subsistence to all multiplied natures, precede them in existence.
In short, there is no essence, or multitude of powers, which is not
allotted its generation from _the one_. It is necessary, therefore,